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CEO Duality Structure and Firm Performance in Pakistan
QAISER RAFIQUE YASSER, ABDULLAH AL MAMUN & ABDUL RAHIM SURIYA

ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of CEO duality on firm performance; which attracted much attention, especially in
emerging economies, yet yielded several inconsistent empirical results. CEO duality exists when the offices of the CEO
and Chairman are retained by the same person. This study examines the relationship between CEO duality and the
performance of Pakistani public listed companies by using a sample of five years, from 2007 to 2011. This study tested
the hypotheses with data obtained from the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 indexed firms, and employed the agency and
stewardship theory perspectives. However, our empirical results do not show a significant relationship between CEO
duality and firm performance, but CEO qualification and CEO affiliation are positively associated with firm performance.
The results suggest that CEO duality is a less significant issue in corporate governance than suggested by many previous
researchers and policy makers. The paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance and firm performance
by introducing a framework in identifying and analyzing moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO
duality and firm performance.
Keywords: CEO duality; firm performance; Pakistan
INTRODUCTION
The term “Duality” describes the corporate leadership
structure where one person holds both the positions of CEO
and Board Chairman in an organization (Finkelstein &
D’Aveni 1994; Abdullah 2004; Wang et al. 2014; Arslan et
al. 2014); and it has become an emerging issue of research
in the current era following corporate scandals around
the world (Elsayed 2007; Michael & Anurag 2007; Peng,
Zhang & Li 2007; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009; Chahine &
Tohmé 2009; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel & Bierman 2010).
Interestingly, ten out of these corporate collapses in early
2000, eight had the CEO/Chairman duality (Albrecht &
Albrecht 2004).
The terminology ‘CEO duality’ in the literature is
diverse. The dual position (CEO and chairman is the same
individual) is also referred to as combined CEO/Chairman
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994; Judge et al. 2003 and
Lam & Lee 2008), CEO-chair duality (Bhagat & Bolton,
2008), unitary leadership structure (Brickley et al. 1997),
joint CEO/chairman (Daily & Dalton 1997), and CEO as
chairman, among others.
This paper principally investigates the relationship
between CEO/Chairman duality and the performance of
Pakistani public listed companies. The other attributes of
the CEO have also been taken into consideration and their
effect on firm performance investigated. As for the U.S.’s
firms, they have pragmatic dominant board leadership
structure, as observed in 70% to 80% of them (Rechner &
Dalton 1991 and Rhoades et al. 2001). Conversely, almost
90% of London Stock Exchange companies separate these
two offices (Kang & Zaardkoohi 2005).

The major contribution of this study is that it provides
auxiliary empirical evidence lending support to the
espousal of good corporate governance practices such as
prescribed by the Cadbury Committee (1992) and related
guidelines. A further contribution made by this study is
that it provides fresh evidence from an emerging market,
Pakistan. Pakistan revamped its corporate governance
structure in 2002 through the issuance of code of corporate
governance and a revised code issued in 2012 by the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP).
The first code (2002) suggests the separation of CEO and
Chairman’s offices, but the latest code used the phrase
“must be separated” for both positions.
Thus, we intend to address the question of whether the
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman contributes to
the corporate performance of public listed companies in
Pakistan. In doing this, we aim to contribute to the literature
in two ways. First, by specifically examining CEO duality,
a setting that has been more frequently analyzed in the
context of multiple governance prescriptions. Second, by
offering more topical evidence of potential relevance to
emerging economies, and to Pakistan in particular.
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING CEO DUALITY
A unifying theme of the various arguments in support
of duality is that combining the CEO and Chairman
positions boosts the board’s effectiveness. Donaldson &
Davis (1991) argued that the stewardship theory offers
a complementary perspective, by stating that agents are
good stewards to organization’s resources. Stewardship
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theorists advocated that there is no inherent conflict of
interest between agents and principals because, among
other reasons, CEOs will not risk their reputation and career
by pursuing interests that collide with the shareholders.
The CEO also derives job satisfaction from non-tangible
enticements such as professional reputation, industry
recognition, goodwill, career advancement and authority.
These motivations uphold the alignment of interests and
ruin management opportunism.
A related theory is that dual leadership structure
reduces the cost of information transfer between the
company’s decision makers. The combined CEO position
avoids the need for the transfer of information that must
take place if different individuals hold the two positions.
Since the information transfer may be costly, untimely,
or incomplete, having significant information residing in
dual role may press forward the ability of that individual
to perform the strategic role.
The supporters of duality also argue that a combined
position provides a combined command structure, single
focal point and reduces the company’s cost in decision
making. A CEO-Chair can exert greater authority and speed
in making and implementing strategic decisions for the
company, creating the image of stability. Thus, decisions
made by a CEO-Chair on an important issue may be
clearer, timelier, projecting a clear sense of direction, and
more consistent than decisions made by a CEO who has to
negotiate and consult with a board that is led by a separate
Chair. Moreover, having only an individual occupying
both the CEO and Chair positions reduces public confusion
on who is in charge of the company, and clarifies who
is responsible for the firm’s performance and long term
sustainability.
ARGUMENTS OPPOSING CEO/CHAIRMAN DUALITY
The agency theorists stated that the separation between
the roles of the CEO and Chairman (Judge et al. 2003)
safeguards accountability and blight the board’s ability
to monitor managerial opportunism because CEO has the
propensity to control the board (Daily & Dalton 1993;
Wang et al. 2014). Agency theory supporters argued
that separation enhances the board’s effectiveness in
management responsibilities by improving both the
superiority and the suitability of decision making. A nonexecutive board Chairperson may bring fresh knowledge,
self-determination and insights to the board’s decisionmaking process which provides distinctive outlooks that
enhance the board’s ability in its management duties to
deliberate and make strategic and fundamental business
decisions.
Charan (2005) argues that duality minimizes the risk
of entrenchment due to the lack of motivation and incentive
to objectively evaluate and discipline the dual executive;
which increase the risk of entrenching the CEO-Chair in
both positions. However, dual positions’ entrenchment,
in turn, increases the potential for this powerful executive

to use the corporation to further his own private interests
instead of furthering common shareholder wellbeing.
In a company where the chairman of the board is also
the CEO of the company, the powers will be concentrated
onto one individual and the possibility for the checking
and balancing of CEOs’ power are virtually eliminated. In
such corporation, the board of director may not be able to
function as an independent body, where that is the purpose
of the board. Taking the agency theory’s perspective,
separating the role of CEO and chairman will decrease the
opportunity for the CEO and inside directors to exercise
behaviors which are self-motivated and costly to the
provision of finance (Principal).
Stewart et al. (1991) has also proposed on the
necessary separation of CEO and board chairman functions;
one individual cannot perform both roles effectively as
both roles have their distinctive domain.
CEO DUALITY IN PAKISTAN
Corporate governance system in Pakistan is possibly
less evolved than those in Anglo-American countries,
Germany, or Japan. In the intervening time, emerging
economies as a whole differ substantially from developed
countries in terms of their institutional, regulatory and
legal background (Prowse 1999). Nonetheless, there
are substantial divergence in corporate governance
frameworks and practices between Pakistan and most
developing economies. The development of corporate
governance mechanisms depends on the social, political,
cultural and historical characteristics of a country (Prowse
1999). Pakistan carries the legacy of being nearly two
hundred years under British colonial rule. This resulted in
similar administrative style, as far as corporate governance
is concerned. Besides, it allows Pakistan to inherit an
English-style institutional and regulatory framework in
the form of a Companies Act.
Pakistan is a common law country having one tier
board structure and the mainstream public companies
display concentrated ownership pattern with family or/
and holding company ownership. In several instances,
controlling group controls the firms directly or employs an
outsider CEO, but the family’s head or elder is exerted as
Chairman of the Board. Meanwhile, business atmosphere
in Pakistan is illustrated by the influence of dominant
controlling shareholders, minority representation and
management, in favor of the first. In order to improve the
corporate governance environment in Pakistan, an array
of institutional and regulator inventiveness have been
implemented as a result of the monumental corporate
scandals in USA and UK.
SECP and State Bank of Pakistan have initiated
numerous reforms aimed at improving corporate
governance mechanism in Pakistan. In the midst of these,
the vital development is the implementation of the code
of Corporate Governance in Pakistan in 2002; which
was substantially revised in 2012. Pakistan Institute of
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Corporate Governance (PICG) was established in 2004, it
increases awareness and champions the derivation of good
governance practices, and it develops professionalism
and encourages engagement of corporate bodies and
individuals into the role of overseeing efficiency.
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES
CEO duality is considered as one of the most discussed and

controversial topics in corporate governance literature
(Abdullah 2004; Fosberg 2004; Wang et al. 2014),
which provides persuasive, but competing, predictions
(Rechner & Dalton 1991). The board is a governance
mechanism in agency framework, for strategic decision
making and setting organization vision (Abdullah 2004),
by the supposition that when the shareholders have the
information to verify and influence supervision deeds,
the executives are more likely to act in the interests of
the shareholders.
Moreover, agency theorists put forward one key
monitoring feature which is the separation between the
roles of the CEO and chairman (Abdullah 2004; Li &
Li 2009). According to this view, duality may blight
the board’s ability to watch for executive opportunism
(Daily & Dalton 1993) because the powerful chief
executive is able to control the board. Moreover, agency
theorist claims that a powerful leader holding both the
CEO and board chairman positions will tend to pursue his
personal interests more willingly than for the benefit of
the principal (Weisbach 1988). An individual with dual
positions will tend to operate ceremonially, communicate
poorly and “rubber-stamp” the executive’s verdicts (Chen
& Young 2009 and Hu et al. 2009).
On the other hand, the separation of CEO and
chairman positions sends positive signals to corporate
lenders and investors. Hence, increases the chances
of raising additional capital that reduces the risk of
bankruptcy. Yermack (1996) reported that firms are more
valuable when the CEO and chairman’s offices are held
separately. Fosberg (2004) opined that in firms where
the positions of CEO and chairman are clearly separated,
the level of debt in their capital structure is most likely
to be optimally employed. Besides, Ehikioya & Benjami
(2009) discovered that for firms in which their CEO and
Board chairman are separated, stakeholders are likely to
gain confidence in the firms’ ability to raise additional
capital; and hence, there are less chances of bankruptcy.
CEOs have higher fiduciary powers, stemming from
their hierarchical role and relational power, based on
proficiency and esteem, than the board (Stiles 2001).
However, both leading positions achieve by same
persona, not only greater formal authority over board
members, but also an increased informal influence over
board processes (Allan & Widman 2000).
Accordingly, duality has been disparaged as it
curtails monitoring (Zajac & Westphal 1994). Thus,
those who demand for the restructuring of corporate
governance mechanism stress on the significance of

attentive monitoring afforded by the absence of duality
(Lorsch & MacIver 1989 and Stiles 2001). This is
an interesting argument to those who want these two
positions split. However, Stiles (2001) disagreed, in view
of the implication of acquisitions and potential agency
issues concerned; whereby through the backing of agency
theory, it is anticipated that the duality will be more likely
to affect acquisition performance negatively.
C o n v e r s e l y, s t e w a r d s h i p t h e o r y o ff e r s a
complementary perception; stating that agents are good
stewards to company resources and can lead to efficient
company (Donaldson & Davis 1991).
Gillan (2006) found a positive relationship between
CEO duality and firm financial performance. Further,
Faleye (2007) showed that CEO duality is positively
related to organizational complexity, CEO reputation and
managerial ownership. This finding is in line with Peng,
Zhang and Li (2007) and their findings on CEO duality
strongly support the stewardship theory.
Proponents of stewardship theory argued that
stability in leadership structure should have a number of
advantages, as it allows lucid delineation of leadership and
control responsibilities; that over time are well understood
by management, board members, and the investors (Boyd,
1995; Daily & Dalton 1997). Meanwhile, Finkelstein &
D’Aveni (1994), Leng (2004), Adams et al. (2005), Gillan
(2006), Kroll et al. (2008) and Jackling & Johl (2009)
showed that the shareholders’ benefits are improved by
combining the roles of chairman and CEO.
Stewardship theory yields a contrasting hypothesis
regarding acquisition performance. If it is true that
CEO duality results in more consistent strategies’
formulation and implementation; and subsequently
better firm performance, then the effects of acquisition
announcement should be positive. Hence, from the above
review of literature, we conjecture that the effect of CEO
on firm performance is unresolved, which requires an
investigation on a strong relationship between CEO duality
and firm performance. Therefore, under the stewardship
framework, it is hypothesized that:
H1: There is a positive association between CEO duality
and firm performance.
There is an increasing body of research which
shows that there is not a single model that adequately
portrays corporate governance in all national contexts
(La Porta et al. 1997 & 1998). Firms in developing
countries have different institutional expectations than
in developed countries, and such different institutional
contexts may lead to a different relationship with firm
performance (Judge et al. 2003; Abdullah 2004). Due
to this prospective, developing countries do not endorse
the appointments of chairman from the CEO of the same
company in their respective code of corporate governance.
The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance states
that “a chief executive should not go on to be chairman
of the same company. If exceptionally a board decides
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that a chief executive should become chairman, the
board should consult major shareholders in advance and
should set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of
the appointment and in the next annual report” (p. 7).
The code of corporate governance 2002 in Pakistan
states that “The Chairman of a listed company shall
preferably be elected from among the non-executive
directors of the listed company. The Board of Directors
shall clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities
of the Chairman and Chief Executive, whether or not
these offices are held by separate individuals or the same
individual.” (Clause ix, p. 3)
The recent empirical research on CEO duality reveal
mixed and inconclusive picture both in developing and
developed countries. While a number of studies supported
CEO duality, several others concluded otherwise; and an
additional set of studies (Dalton et al. 1998 and Dahya
2004) did not reveal significant relationships between
leadership structure and firm performance. To recap on the
earlier theoretical discussion, the results provide support
that duality does not affect firm performance (Dahya et
al. 1996; Laing & Weir 1999; Dedman 2000; Franks et al.
2001; Rhoades et al. 2001; Weir et al. 2002; Higgs 2003;
Leng 2004; Kao & Chen 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Davidson
et al. 2005 and Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali 2006).
Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell (1997) showed that CEO
duality is not associated with inferior performance; while
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) concluded that there
are no discernible differences in performance that can
be attributed to a firm’s leadership structure. There are
studies which also noticed that the association between
CEO duality and firm performance is moderated by
family control factor (Ballinger & Marcel 2010; Elsaid
& Davidson 2009 and Elsaid, Davidson & Benson
2009). Nonetheless, although most of the empirical
researches on the relationship between CEO duality and
firm performance focused on large corporations (Dalton
et al. 1998), some recent papers researched on transition
economies.

FIGURE

Figure 1 represents the CEO’s influence in the related
tasks and we can see from this figure that the CEO’s level
of activity is quite high in all the tasks and it is foreseeable
that the CEOs in the Pakistani public listed companies
are involved in most of the firm’s areas. Figure 1 also
indicates that the CEO’s power has two different tendencies.
Foremost, there are two tasks in which the CEO’s powers
are high; fiduciary duties and operational function. This
is consistent with the fact that these are basic CEO’s tasks.
In contrast, there are three tasks where the CEO has less
power; succession plan, policy making and design, and
implement strategic vision. This is a clear indication of
the increasing role being played by the board of directors
in strategic management.
METHODOLOGY
For this study, a sample of 100 companies were taken from
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 indexed companies from
2007 to 2011 (five years). Five companies were excluded
due to non availability of data or missing data. According to
the Karachi Stock Exchange official brochure “The KSE-100
Index was introduced in November 1991 with a base value of
1,000 points. The KSE - 100 Index comprises of 100 selected
companies on the basis of sector representation and highest
market capitalization, which capture over 90% of total
market capitalization of companies listed on the Exchange.”
The sample’s selection procedure was based on sectors.
From the 33 sectors, 32 companies were selected, i.e. one
company from each sector (excluding Open-End Mutual
Fund Sector) on the basis of the largest market capitalization
and the remaining 66 companies were selected on the basis
of largest market capitalization in descending order; where
this is based a total return index, i.e. dividend, bonus and
rights are adjusted.
Data on obligatory variables was collected through
secondary sources. Meanwhile, data on corporate governance
internal mechanism was collected through corporate
information pages, the code of corporate governance

1. Comparison on Basic CEO Tasks
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compliance report, directors’ profiles and directors’ report
to the shareholders. Data related to the financial part of the
study was collected from financial statement section of
Annual Reports. Table 1 represents the data set of five years
on the basis of availability.
Table 2 illustrates the summary of the dual characteristics
of the sample; i.e. Dual CEO position and separate CEO
position. The result indicates that for family firms, 85%
(402) of them have a separate position for CEO, in contrast
to 15% (73) in dual CEO position. Interestingly, the average
year of affiliation with the firm in separate CEO /chair is 9
years, while the affiliation of CEO with the firm is 12 years
in the case of duality.
Particularly, prior research showed that shorter CEO
decision horizon has a significant agency cost (Antia,
Pantzalis & Park 2010), and thus, CEO tenure is controlled
as the impact of firms having long- serving CEOs cannot
be easily undone, which might arises due to the CEO’s
lack of discipline which results in firm’s poor performance
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia 2009; Lau, Sinnadurai & Wright
2009). Moreover, 84% (301) of CEOs have postgraduate
qualifications if they are only the CEO; but in duality, only
16% (59) of the CEOs have postgraduate or professional
qualification.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS

This study applies multivariate regression analysis
to test the relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance. The underlying assumption is that the
multiple regression model is used to check the multicollinearity based on the correlation matrix as well as the
variance factors (Yermack, 1996; Boyd, 1995). Therefore,
the following regression equation is proposed:
Performance = α + β1CEO DUAL + β2Control + ∈
(1)
TABLE

Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Combine

Number of Firms
14
12
15
16
16

Percentage
15%
13%
16%
17%
17%

Have Family Relations
Tenure with the firm
Ownership of firm equity
Postgraduate CEO
Avg. CEO Age
Female CEO

Performance Variables The variables employed for firm
profitability were Economic Value Added (EVA), Return
on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and Earnings Per Share (EPS).
Economic Value Added (EVA) was popularized by a
management consultancy firm, Stern Stewart & Company.
It is a mechanism (which is accounting-based) simplified
as the following:
EVA

= Operating Profit after tax – (Operating
expenses – Invested Capital)		
(2)

Return on Assets (ROA) also known as return on
investment, measures how a company’s assets are
generating profits for the company, or earnings from assets.
It is measured by dividing earnings or net income, in this
case annual earnings or net income, of the company’s total
assets for the same fiscal period.
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of
equity and market value debt to replacement costs of firm’s
assets. In Pakistan, as some other developing countries,
there is no active market for debt. Khana & Palepu (1999)
argued that using market-based indicator is inappropriate in
emerging countries where illiquid and thin trading market
dictate the absence of efficient capital market.
Earnings per Share (EPS), one of the commonly
accepted measures, is employed to determine the impact
of independent and moderating variables. EPS measures the
worth to shareholders on the earnings attributable to each
ordinary share over the time; and is calculated as net profit
divided by number of ordinary shares, multiplied by the
percentage (Abdullah 2004; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009).

1. Yearly Set of dual CEO sample

TABLE

Characteristic

VARIABLES DESCRIPTION

Table 3 provides the variables description.

Split

Number of Firms
81
83
80
79
79

Percentage
85%
87%
84%
83%
83%

2. CEO duality characteristics
Split

402
9 years
6.89%
301
55
7

Combine
73
12 years
2.38%
59
54
8

Total
95
95
95
95
95
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TABLE

Governance Variables
(A)

CEO Duality (DUAL)

(B)

Return on Assets (ROA)

Performance Variable
(C)

Tobin’s Q (Q)

(D)

Economic Value (EVA)

3. Description of Variables

Binary variable indicating 1 if CEO Duality, or - 0 otherwise.
Net Profit divided by Total Assets

Added

The book value of debt plus the market value of equity, divided
by the book value of assets.
Net Operating Profit After Taxation (NOPAT)
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
Invested Capital (IC)
EVA = NOPAT – (WACC × IC)

(E)

Earnings Per Share (EPS)

(F)

Financial Leverage (FL)

Total Debt/Total Equity

(H)

Firm Age (FAGE)

Total number of years the company incorporated

Controll Variables
(G)
(I)

(J)

(K)
(L)

(M)

Firm Size (FSIZE)

CEO Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age

CEO Qualification
CEO Tenure

Net income/weighted average of common shares outstanding.

Natural Logarithm of Total Assets

The percentage of ownership held by the CEO in the firm.

Binary variable indicating 1 if female CEO, or - 0 otherwise.
The number of years of CEO age.

Binary variable indicating 1 if CEO holds Master degree or
professional qualification, or - 0 otherwise.
The number of years of CEO affiliation with the firm.

Dependent Variable CEO duality (DUAL) is a dummy
variable that assumes the value one if the firm’s CEO and
Chairman of the Board is the same person, or zero if
otherwise (Berg & Smith 1978; Rechner & Dalton 1991;
Boyd 1995; Frankforter et al. 2007; Henry 2009; Kim et
al. 2009; Wang et al. 2014). Meanwhile, Lam and Lee
(2008) observed that the separation of these rules does
not necessarily improve a board’s monitoring capability
if the CEO and Chairman of the Board belong to the
same family. Therefore, following Lei and Song (2004)
and Lam and Lee (2008) we consider CEO duality as the
observations in which these two roles are performed by
the same person.

Previous empirical studies demonstrated that firm
performance is negatively related to total assets (Lang
& Stulz 1994). Therefore, in order to control for firm
size, we included the variables natural logarithm of total
assets (FSIZE). Firm age was calculated as the natural
logarithm of the number of years from the incorporation
of the firm, which helped to control for organization’s
maturity (Arthurs et al. 2008 and Matta & Beamish 2008).
The logarithmic form of analysis was applied to reduce
heteroskedasticity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994).

Controll Variable Ahmed et al. (2006) argued that
financial leverage may lead to improved external control
because creditors would monitor capital structure more
intensively in order to protect their interests. Accordingly,
Chen and Jaggi (2000) stated that financial leverage (FL) is
used to measure firm leverage. CEO tenure is measured as
the number of years that the CEO being employed by the
firm (frankfurter et al. 2007 and Kim et al. 2009).
CEO education has an impact on corporate performance,
including innovation, strategic choices, and risk taking
(Matta & Beamish 2008 and Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010).
Thus, CEO education was also controlled in order to avoid
influence on duality-firm performance (Ling, Simsek,
Lubatkin, & Veiga 2008).

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

DATA ANALYSIS

Tables 4 and 5 depict the descriptive statistics for the
variables used in our analysis. Table 4 segregates the data
into Dual CEO (73 companies) and Separate CEO (402
companies). The maximum CEO shareholding percentage
is double in firms with dual CEO (58%) as compared to
firms with separate CEO (30%), while the mean is more
than double in dual CEO and separate CEO at 6.88 and
2.39, respectively.
Results of descriptive statistics indicate that in
terms of gender, 11% of combined-role companies have
female CEOs; but in contrast, there is only 1.7% in splitCEO companies. The average age of CEO in both types of
companies is approximately the same, but CEO’s tenure
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TABLE

Variables
CEO Duality
CEO Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
Economic Value Added
Return on Assets (ROA)
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Tobin’s Q

Min

0
0.00
0.0
43
1
0.0
7
6.20
0.00
0
-0.25
-25.20
0.06

4. Descriptive Statistics (Dual and non-dual basis)

Dual CEO (N=73)
Max

0
58.00
1.0
60
24
1.0
65
8.98
3.61
1
0.35
255
5.52
TABLE

Variables

Governance

CEO Duality

Control

CEO Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage

Performance
Economic Value Added (EVA)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Tobin’s Q

Mean
0.00
6.88
0.11
54.95
12.25
0.81
33.64
7.23
0.211
0.40
0.096
21.39
1.26

S. D

0.0
15.06
0.315
3.86
5.98
0.39
18.94
0.71
0.512
0.49
0.108
52.78
1.1937

Min

1
0.00
0.0
21
1
0
5
5.11
0.00
0
-0.88
-26.35
0.05

Separate CEO (N=402)
Max

1
30.00
1.0
70
32
1
152
9.06
1.99
1
0.53
300.87
9.16

Mean
1.00
2.39
0.017
54.19
9.03
0.75
37.83
7.427
0.14
0.37
0.065
15.03
0.99

S. D

1.00
5.32
0.13
6.73
6.14
0.44
27.83
0.698
0.193
0.483
0.138
33.8
1.072

t-value
1.00**
8.58**
3.93**
185.7**
33.37**
38.52**
30.37**
229.3**
12.01**
16.78**
11.29**
9.34**
20.59**

5. Descriptive Statistics of all variables
Min.

Max.

Mean

S.D.

0

1

0.15

1.39

0.00
0.0
21
1
0.0
5
5.11
0.00

58.00
1.0
70
32
1.0
152
9.06
3.61

3.076
0.032
54.31
9.52
0.758
37.19
7.397
0.148

7.813
0.175
6.375
6.221
0.429
26.683
0.703
0.268

0
-0.88
-26.35
0.05

1
0.53
300.87
9.16

0.37
0.069
16.003
1.035

0.484
0.135
37.346
1.0948

is 12 years in combined-role companies and 9 years
in separate-role companies, which indicates that the
person holding dual roles in Pakistan normally has long
affiliation with the same firm.
On the average, Dual CEO companies have qualified
CEO (81% holding master degree) while 75% of the
split CEO have master degree. The maximum age of firm
for separate CEO is 152 years (that is the oldest listed
companies in the Karachi stock exchange) instead of 65
years of incorporation of the dual-CEO firm.
Table 5 indicates the descriptive results for all sample
companies. CEO duality was found in 15.4% of our sample
(73 out of 475 firms), having family relationships taken
into consideration. In a previous study on developing
economy, CEO duality ratios ranged between 42% and
25% (Andrade et al. 2008). This downward trend in CEO
duality may indicate that Pakistani firms are progressively
adopting the code of corporate governance.

Of sampled firms, 37% have positive economic value
added (EVA) and the remaining 63% represent economic
loss. The value of Earnings per Share (EPS) is highly
diverse; at -26.35 (minimum) to 300.87 (maximum).
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS
The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in
Table 6. The results revealed that CEO/Chairman duality
do not have positive association with any performance
variables. Subsequently, Economic Value Added (EVA) is
negatively correlated with CEO Duality. Meanwhile, the
duality is negatively correlated with the percentage of
CEO shareholding, female CEO, CEO’s years of affiliation
and financial leverage; but is positively correlated with
the firm size (FSIZE).

CEO Age

4.

Financial Leverage

Firm Size

Firm Age

CEO Qualification

CEO Tenure

-.084

-.062

-.090

12. EPS

Tobin’s Q (Q)

-.022

-.100

*

.102*

.057

-.050

-.187

**

-.043

-.190**

-.208

**

Dual

11. ROA

10. EVA

9.

8.

7.

6.

5.

Gender Diversity

CEO Shareholding

3.

2.

Variable

-.030

-.072

-.010

-.040

.031

-.091*

*

-.117

-.252**

**

.219

-.124**

-.058

2

.132**

.000

.017

.085

**

.215

-.129**

-.094*

-.022

.070

-.021

.001

.152**

-.029

-.120
**

.018

-.121**
.064

4

.043

.105*

.063

.005

-.050

-.282**

-.008

-.102*

5

-.005

.161**

**

.186

**

.131

-.084

.036

.130**

6

6. Correlation Coefficient Analysis

-.100*

-.028

3

TABLE

-.005

.209**

.058

-.004

-.159**

.046

7

-.362**

-.113*

-.197

**

.027

-.223**

8

.213**

.068

-.117*

-.060

9

*

.132**

*

.163**

*

.332**

10

-.010

.026

11

*

.204**

12

64

65

The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q (Q) and the
regression coefficient analysis are presented in Table
9. Model 2 examines the effect of dual leadership
structure and controlled variables on firm performance.
Tobin’s Q explained 19.2% of the total variance in firm
performance. However, the results indicate that Q has a
positive association with financial leverage, but a negative
association with firm size. However, we did not find any
association with CEO duality (β= 0.218, p< 0.05).
Table 10 presents a regression coefficient analysis for
the dependent variable, Earnings per Share (EPS). Model 2
examines the effects of independent variable (CEO/Chair
Duality) and controll variables on firm performance. EPS
explained 10.3% of the total variance in firm performance.
However, the results indicate that EPS has a positive
association with CEO qualification, CEO affiliation with
the firm, firm age, firm size and financial leverage; but we
did not find any association with CEO duality (β= 0.392,
p< 0.05).
Table 11 presents the summary of the significant
variables with the performance and the association of the

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Table 7 presents regression coefficients for the dependent
variables of Economic Value Added (EVA). Model 1
examines the effect of controlled variables on firm
performance. Interestingly, EVA explained 7.7% of the
total variance in firm performance. Results conclude that
the higher qualification of the CEO (β= 0.007, p< 0.05) is
positively, while firm size (β= 0.000, p< 0.05) is negatively,
associated with the economic performance of the firm.
The main result indicates that there is not any association
between EVA and CEO duality.
Table 8 presents regression coefficients for dependent
variables of Return on Assets (ROA). Model 2 examines
the effect of controlled variables on firm performance. ROA
explained 9.6% of the total variance in firm performance.
Results conclude that the higher qualification of the CEO
(β= 0.000, p< 0.05) and CEO age (AGE) (β= 0.039, p< 0.05),
are positively associated with the ROA; but firm size (FSIZE)
is negatively associated with the firm performance. The
main result also indicates that there is not any association
between ROA and CEO duality.

TABLE

7. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable EVA)

Variables

CEO Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²
TABLE

Variables

CEO Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.735
0.207
0.994
0.396
0.007
0.752
0.000
0.195

0.754
0.212
0.988
0.412
0.007
0.751
(0.000)
0.199
0.939

0.840
0.074
0.591
0.581
0.006

0.956

0.958
(0.000)
0.229
0.919

27.7
26.1
4.875
0.000

27.7
25.9
4.325
0.000

22.5
21.3
2.024
0.061

25.3
24.5
6.559
0.000

8. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable ROA)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.490
0.676
0.029
0.575
0.000
0.410
(0.000)
0.039

0.664
0.855
0.039
0.723
0.000
0.405
(0.000)
0.033
0.262

0.688
0.748
0.137
0.098
0.000

0.304

0.241
(0.000)
0.014
0.081

19.6
18.1
6.220
0.000

19.9
18.1
5.672
0.000

15.0
13.8
4.083
0.001

16.0
15.2
7.476
0.000
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research’s main variable, CEO/Chair duality. Results in
Table 11 generally suggest that CEO duality has no negative
or positive effect with firm performance. These results
are broadly consistent with the findings in other studies
(Annuar & Shamsher 1994 and Fosberg 1989).
In order to establish the level and direction of
regression analysis, among the variables of interest, above
is the Regression Analysis Matrix (Abdullah 2004). This
matrix attempts to provide insights to the hypothesis tests
that the study intended to test. It can be observed that we
reject the hypothesis that there is a significant positive
relationship between CEO Duality and performance of firms
at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).
In summary, the empirical results support the
hypothesis that in firms where the positions of CEO and
Chairman of the Board being held by the same person, no
effect on their performance can be observed.
CONCLUSION
Academic research suggests that firm performance is
associated with board leadership structures. The purpose
TABLE

Variables

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²

TABLE

Variables
CEO

R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.106

0.236
(0.00)
0.000
0.437

23.5
22.3
2.836
0.010

18.4
17.7
26.50
0.000

0.180
0.471
0.260
0.364
0.908
0.323
(0.00)
0.000

0.116
0.649
0.214
0.267
0.969
0.319
(0.000)
0.000
0.218

0.192
0.015
0.037
0.402
0.722

29.2
27.8
13.845
0.000

29.5
27.9
12.49
0.000

10. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable EPS)

Shareholding

Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality

9. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable Q)
(1)

CEO Shareholding

of the study is to investigate the relationship between CEO
duality and the performance of Pakistani public listed
companies for the period of 2007 to 2011. The theoretical
and empirical literature on corporate governance offers
two alternative perspectives.
The agency theory advocates that the separation
of the two roles is an important determinant to a
board’s independence and effectiveness. Conversely, the
stewardship theory postulates that firms with a unified
leadership structure operate more efficiently through
better coordination and unambiguous command, thus
deal more effectively with strategic challenges. The
leadership structure of the majority of Pakistani companies
is characterized by the separation of roles of CEO and
chairman.
Our empirical findings provide clear answers to
the emerging issue in developing countries. We find
significant differences in firm’s characteristics between
dual and non-dual CEO firms. However, our multivariate
tests find no evidence that CEO duality has a significant
effect on firm performance. Our evidence casts doubt on
the notion that firms changing from duality to non-dual

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.299
0.812
0.944
0.024
0.001
0.000
0.024
0.006

0.231
0.684
0.878
0.039
0.002
0.000
0.025
0.007

0.131
0.916
0.533
0.010
0.001

0.392

0.319

0.246

10.3
8.7
6.674

10.4
8.7
6.010

4.7
3.5
3.827
0.001

7.3
6.5
9.251
0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000
0.007
0.022
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TABLE

Dependent
Variable
EVA

ROA

EPS

Tobin’s Q

11. Statistical Test Findings

Variable
CEO Qualification

Asymptotic Significance

Not significant

Firm Size
CEO Duality

0.939

Firm Size
CEO Duality

0.262

Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality

0.392

CEO Qualification

CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification

Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality

leadership structure would experience improvement in
their performance. The above results are supported by
prior researches on the relationship between separate
leadership structure and firm performance. The results are
consistent with the studies conducted by Vance (1978);
Sullivan (1988); Rechner & Dalton (1989); Leng (2004);
Dahya, Galguera-Garcia & Bommel (2009) and Yasser
(2011) where they reported that duality is not significant
to firm performance.
According to Abdullah (2004), combined leadership
(either single or joint) is not related to performance
because financial ratios may not capture the board and
leadership roles in establishing a firm’s value, but long
term measures such as firms’ growth and their share prices
might be useful measures. An implication for further
research in Pakistan relates to several areas of “boundary
conditions” of the agency, stewardship and organizational
theories in corporate governance (Yammeesri & Herath
2010; Yasser 2011). Multidisciplinary studies of this
nature may contribute to a better understanding of
what drives the effectiveness of leadership structure in
Pakistan. For example, future work can investigate the
specific situations and circumstances in which CEO duality
may be beneficial to Pakistani firms. Investigating the
factors of board’s effectiveness with multiple theoretical
lenses may help develop more effective corporate
governance models.
In view that our study is a first step in many regards,
its limitations should be noted. First, this study is based
on KSE-100 companies from 2007 to 2011; however, a
large sample and more recent data are required. Second,
we focused on relatively large, publicly traded firms
(KSE 100), suggesting that our results may not extend
to smaller firms. Small firms tend to have lesser public
scrutiny than large firms, indicating that accountability
and independence play an even larger role in minimizing

0.218

Significant
0.007
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
(0.039)
0.002
0.000
(0.025)
0.007
(0.000)
0.000

agency conflicts. Although this study focused on the role
of CEO duality and firm performance, future researchers
should consider panel data analysis for better results.
CEO duality is good for some firms, while it is the
opposite for other firms (Boyd 1995; Brickley et al. 1997;
Elsayed 2007); a particular firm may adopt CEO duality
under an appropriate or inappropriate organizational
condition (Kang and Zardkoohi 2005). Likewise, it is
too early to draw a conclusion and further study may also
be conducted to examine the industry-specific impact
of board leadership structure and firm performance in
emerging economies.
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